Statistical methods are subject to dual evaluation: Both their mathematical and practical properties are important. Although the mathematical properties of various statistical mettlOds have been studied extensively and formally, the evaluation of statistical practice by field tests has mostly been informal and anecdotal. Subjective Bayesian methods can be viewed as an exception to this: The substantial literature on subjective probability judgments can be viewed as relevant to the evaluation of these methods. The large litHrature on probability miscalibration of subjective prior estimates casts doubt on their use in Bayesian estimation. However, an interesting defense of subjective Bayesian methods was offered by Samaniego and Reneau (1994) . In a classroom experiment, using a novel method to elicit subjective priors, they showed that their students were mostly good Bayesians. The students generated point estimates that had smaller average squared This study was in part supported by an award to Yuelin Li from the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange: http://www.cckf.org.
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We discuss the relationship of the calibration literature to subjective Bayesian methods, the novel method used by Samaniego and Reneau and some issues arising from this method. We then report three experiments designed to investigate the usefulness of their proposed method.
Background

Calibration and Interval Estimation in Statistics
A series of subjective probabilities is said to be calibrated if, grouping together all events with subjective probability near p, the proportion of them actually found to occur is "" p. Many studies of calibration have subjects estimate directly a subjective interval with a specified probability (e.g., 50% or 80%) of containing a particular parameter. Often these are "almanac" questions-parameters such as the lengths famous rivers, and so forth. Such studies generally show poor calibration, typically in the direction of overconfidence (Keren, 1997; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) . For example, Alpert and Raiffa (1982) found that when respondents tried to provide interval estimates with a 50% probability of including the true value, only about 33% of the intervals produced actually did include it; for 98% target intervals, actual coverage was only 57%. Extensive efforts to rectify poor calibration have met with limited success (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; Fischer, 1982; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Van Lenthe, 1994) . However, the conditions under which overconfidence occurs are only partly understood, despite extensive research (Keren, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wright & Wisudha, 1982; Yaniv & Foster, 1997) . Expertise also plays an important role, but the effects are mixed. Generally, weather forecasters, odds makers, and certified property appraisers are well-calibrated (Hoerl & Fallin, 1974; Murphy & Winkler, 1977; Spence, 1996) and more experienced technical operators have shown less overconfidence than inexperienced operators in their area of expertise (Cooke, Mendel, & Thijs, 1988 ). This has not held true in the case of doctors' diagnoses (Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Oskamp, 1965) . Method of elicitation is also important (Fischer, 1982; Hogarth, 1975) .
Although calibration questions can be raised for all sorts of probabilistic forecasts of events, the questions most relevant to statistical practice concern interval estimates. Classical statistics is much concerned with "coverage probability" for confidence intervals: 95%-confidence intervals are supposed to include the true parameter value with probability 0.95; this is a calibration criterion, though not ordinarily concerned with subjective confidence. Turning to Bayesian methods, it is natural to ask that Bayesian posterior distributions, and in particular, posterior credible intervals, should be approximately well-calibrated.
The empirical literature on calibration is thus relevant to the use of subjective Bayesian methods for parameter estimation. Insofar as the subjective prior distributions fall short of the nominal coverage frequency for a parameter value, the posterior distributions obtained by combining them with the likelihood function for newly observed data {using Bayes'Theorem) will also provide less than the nominal coverage frequency for the parameter.
The Weight-Judgment Approach to Subjlective Priors
Samaniego and Reneau asked students in an introductory statistics class to guess the proportion of 758 pages in a particular edition of the novel Of Human Bondage (Maugham, 1915) whose first words have six or more letters. The students were asked to give their best guess for this target proportion and then to indicate the weight they would place on the sample proportion if they could observe the number of first words with six or more letters in a random sample (with replacement) of 10 pages. They were told clearly that the complementary weight (subtracted from 1.00) would be placed on their guess. The Bayesian point estimate of a parameter can usually be viewed as a weighted average between the prior point estimatethe mean of the prior distribution-and the maximum likelihood estimate, often the sample mean or sample proportion in the nHwly observed data. The weights for this average are approximately (or exactly, in the Gaussian case) inversely proportional to the respective variances of the prior distribution and the maximum likelihood estimator. If the prior distribution is very diffuse, it will have a high variance, and the prior estimate will thus have a low weight relative to the newly observed data. Similarly, if N is large, the maximum likelihood estimator will have a low variance, and will be weighted heavily.
This led Samaniego and Reneau to ask subjects to provide a prior point estimate of a parameter, and then to state the reiativE3 weight that they would put on a sample of size N = 10 of new data, compared to the weight on their prior estimate. The prior point estimate was viewed as diagnostic of the mean of the prior distribution, and the weight placed on the new data as diagnostic of its variance. This weight-judgment method of Samaniego and Reneau is the focus of the present work.
The judgments can be conveniently converted to a continuous prior distribution if one assumes that the prior for an unknown proportion p is some beta distribution with parameters (a, b), and that the estimator for a particular sample size N has a binomial distribution with parameters (N, p). According to Bayes' Theorem, the correct (i.e., Beta/binomial) weights for the prior mean and sample proportion are proportional to a + band N respectively (Novick & Jackson, 1974 In their theoretical development, Samaniego and Reneau presented a criterion under which the average squared error of posterior point estimates will be smaller than the average squared error of the standard frequentist estimator (in this case, the maximum likelihood estimator). In a classroom experiment (described in more detail below, under Experiment 1) most of their students' prior estimates and weights satisfied this criterion.
It is not hard to shift focus and evaluate the calibration for prior interval estimates implied by the Samaniego and Reneau method. Although these two criteria are generally closely related, this focus led them to use quite a different method for eliciting the subjective priors. One can attribute to a subject giving a point estimate p and a weight wa Beta prior with a = pN(1 -w)/wand b = (1 -p)N(1 -w)/w, and one can then construct a posterior credible interval from that Beta distribution (we used Highest-Density Regions, or HDRs, see pp. 33-34 in Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995) . When this is done, the results of Samaniego and Reneau are much closer to good calibration than is usual in the literature: 69% of the 80%-highest-density regions constructed from their students' judgments contained the true parameter value, as did 86% of the 95%-HDRs. It seemed important to ask whether this relatively good calibration is typical of the weight-judgment procedure, and more generally, to explore the properties of the procedure more thoroughly.
Issues in the Current Experiments
On its face, weight-judgment offers one distinct advantage over previous methods, and also one obvious potential problem. The advantage is that the task addresses directly the integration of prior information with new data, and thus could tap into people's intuitions about this type of integration. Because this sort of integration is a ubiquitous aspect of human information processing, intuitions may be highly developed. By contrast, direct interval estimation does not make any connection with how a subjective interval is going to be used in Bayesian statistics.
In methods used in most of the overconfidence literature, the corresponding roles of best guess and weight are played by the midpoint and the length of the subjective interval. To put matters in another way, the weight-judgment task requires the participant to consider interval estimates from the perspective used in Bayesian statistics. How well this can be done is the question we are addressing.
The obvious problem is the use of a particular sample size or other specification of the variance of the maximum likelihood estimator. Samaniego and Reneau used N = 10. How would the results differ for N = 5 or N = 20? The usefulness of the method depends on people's intuitions concerning the way in which reliability of an estimator varies with sample size. A principal feature of our experiments is the comparison of results for two sample sizes, 10 and 50.
Another issue that arises in generalizing from previous results on calibration to the subjective Bayesian schema concerns expertise. Investigators who might make use of the Bayesian schema to integrate prior information with new data will often have considerable expertise concerning both. Such expertise is poorly represented by subjects' responses to "almanac" questions: Subjects may not have considered their sources of prior information very carefully and may have no idea at all what would be involved in a new measurement, for example, of the length of the Mississippi river. In our second l experiment, we use a domain in which college students could be expected to have some background knowledge and where a new data set with N = 10 or N = 50 would have quite a clear meaning.
This article reports three experiments. The first is a replication of Samaniego and Reneau's classroom experiment, with a slightly modified task: We varied the reference sample size, both within and between subjects, to examine the changes in the judged weights. Experiments 2 and 3 explored the issues of sample size and calibration more thoroughly, in a knowledge domain familiar to college students. Subjects were asked to estimate the results of a large-scale sUNey regarding career interests and related attitudes. Results from Experiment 2 led us also to a modification of the weight-judgment method which we hoped would be less subject to confusion or stereotyped respondi ng.
Experiment 1: Weight Judgment for Two Sample Sizes
Method
Pat1icipants
In our partial replication, the same task was given to 201 Columbia University students who volunteered to fill out a short questionnaire as they passed the experimenter's post in the hallways of two heavily used campus buildings. We paid $2.00 to each volunteer.
Procedure
Our volunteers had not necessarily studied statistics, hence each respondent first read a page with detailed instructions on probability estimation and how their own guesses could be adjusted by taking a weighted average between their own guessE3s and the observed proportion of a hypothetical random sample of first words from the 758 pages of the novel.
Respondents then turned to the second page, where one subgroup encountered the following two questions:
1. What is your guess of the percentage of the 758 "first words" in this particular edition of Of Human Bondage that have six or more letters? The percentage is % .
Imagine you were allowed to draw a sample of 10 randomly selected first words out of 758 pages. What weight (in decimal numbers) do you assign to a random sample of 10?
2. My weight placed on a sample of 10 is _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ They then turned to the third and final page and encountered the following question:
What weight do you assign to the data if you were allowed to randomly select a larger sample of 50 pages from the total of 758?
3. My weight placed on a sample of 50 is _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A second subgroup encountered the same materials, except that the sample sizes 10 and 50 were encountered in the opposite order.
The procedure just outlined is actually the one followed at the Engineering building, where we hoped to recruit student volunteers with good quantitative skills. Our first group of volunteers was obtained at a building occupied chiefly by the Anthropology, Art History, and Psychology departments. On that earlier occasion we printed all three questions on the second page of the questionnaire; thus, a number of respondents may have been aware that there would be a question about a different sample size by the time they answered Question 2.
There were 101 volunteers in the first group, 51 of whom had N = 10 first, the remainder the opposite order, and 100 volunteers at the Engineering building, half of whom had N = 10 first, the other half had the opposite order.
Results and Discussion
There were no appreciable or statistically reliable differences between the first and second set of volunteers (despite the potential differences in population sampled and the slight procedural difference). Therefore, we combine the two into a single sample of 201 volunteers in all the analyses that follow. Figure 1 shows how weight judgment varied with sample size. Scatterplot (a) shows the within-respondent relationship between the weight judgments for N = 10 and N = 50. The majority of points fall above the diagonal, that is, a higher weight was assigned to a sample of 50 than to a sample of 10.
Within-Subject Results and Classification of Respondents
A criterion for qualitatively correct weight pairs was in fact satisfied by 141 out of the 201 subjects (about 70%).2 2The 60 "qualitatively flawed" cases included 33 with W10 > W50 (including 6 where 1 = W10 > w50), 22 more with 1 > W10 = W50 . and 5 with w10 = 0 (no weight at all on a sample of size 10) . An additional 4 respondents gave weights of 1 for both sample sizes. This can be viewed as a commitment to ignore the prior guess entirely; these 4 were included with the 141 qualitatively "good" respondents. The heavy curve in (a) shows the correct beta-binomial relation between two weights where the sample sizes differ by a factor of 5:
where w10 and w50 are the weights assigned to sample N = 10 and N = 50, respectively. There is no tendency for the observed weight pairs to cluster tightly about this Bayesian curve.
Many of the analyses to follow present results for all 201 respondents (shown by solid lines in figures) and parallel results for the 141 "good" respondents (shown by dashed lines in figures). Eliminating all the flawed pairs of weight judgments might be far from a good procedure. If we could assume that respondents fall cleanly into two categories, those who have some insight into the task and those who misunderstand it badly, and that correct ordering of the pair of weight judgments is perfectly diagnostic of these two categories, then eliminating the flawed pairs allows us to examine performance measures among those who understand the task. However, these assumptions are probably much too simple. Because we do not have any other way to diagnose good and poor understanding of the task, we are simply left with two distinct estimates of various effects, represented by the solid and dashed curves in the figures. The average weight judgment increased from .36 for N = 10 to .51 for N = 50 (95% confidence interval for the shift is .15 ± .07).
Effect of Sample Size on Weight Judgment: Between-Subject Comparison
To evaluate the adequacy of such a shift, we compare the quantilequantile plot with the heavy curve showing the correct beta-binomial relation (same as in (a)). Looking at all judgments, we would conclude that the increase from N = 10 to N = 50 is substantially smaller than optimal.
However, if we limit attention to the "good" respondents, the difference between the observed and the correct beta-binomial relation is small: The area under the beta-binomial curve is .747, while that for the dashed curve is .721 (with standard error about .035, estimated by bootstrapping).
The analogous comparison for the second weight judgments is shown in Figure 1 (c). Again, the quantile-quantile plot based on all the data is substantially below the beta-binomial relation, but for the "good" respondents , this deficiency disappears.
Although individuals show no tendency to be clustered about the beta-binomial weight shift from N = 10 to N = 50 (solid curve in Figure 1 (a)), the group distributions for "good" respondents (dashed curves) do show approximately the required relationship (Figure 1 (b, c) ). The dashed curves, however, are biased upward to an unknown extent by this selection of respondents, which eliminated many low weight judgments for N = 50 and high ones for N = 10. We hesitate to conclude that even group performance is anywhere near Bayesian. We return to this question in Experiments 2 and 3, where we are in a better position to estimate the degree of upward bias in quantile-quantile plots produced by limiting the analysis to "good" respondents.
Order of judgment appears to have a small effect at most. This is seen in the scatterplot of the weight pairs in Figure 1 (a). The distribution of weight for N = 50 is shifted slightly to the right for the second as compared to the first weight judgment, but this shift is not statistically significant. Figure 2 (b, c) presents pairwise scatterplots for the three judgments. The guessed p judgments are plotted on the abscissa and weights on the ordinate. The scatterplot from Samaniego and Rteneau (1994) is shown for comparison in (a). The light vertical line near .: 30 in (a, b, c) shows the true population value (228 pages out of 758 began with words of six letters or more). Local smoothed lines of scatt, erplot are added using locally weighted regression and are discussed bHlow.
Knowledge Versus Confidence
A striking aspect of the w -versus-P scatterplots (Figure 2 (a, b, c) ) is the absence of any orderly relation: In particular, it is defin itely not true that higher-confidence guesses (w values near 0) tend to be more 'iii 2. .. accurate (closer to .30) than low-confidence ones. One might have expected a V -shaped scatter, with the vertex near the line P = .30, but neither the local regression curves for all respondents (solid) nor those for "good" respondents (dashed) suggest such a pattern.
Respondents do have some knowledge relevant to the guess they are making: In particular, they know that there are many high-frequency short words in English, and that those have a good chance of starting at any given page, thus, there are few very high guesses for P (only about 5% over .70). In fact, 57% of our volunteers and 61 % of Samaniego and Reneau's produced estimates fairly close to the true value, in the interval [.20, AO] . Yet those who guessed rather badly-under 10% or over 50%-were at least as likely to show high confidence.
Problematic Aspects of the Weight Judgments
Although the distributions of best guesses from Experiment 1 and the experiment of Samaniego and Reneau are similar (see quantile-quantile plot, Figure 2 (d)), the weight judgments for N = 10 differ sharply ( Figure  2 (e)). In fact, the weight judgments for N = 50 in the present experiment have about the same mean as those for N = 10 obtained by Samaniego and Reneau, but with a substantially higher variance.
The horizontal alignment of points on the scatterplots and the corners in the quantile-quantile plots show how coarse the weight judgments are, both in Samaniego and Reneau's study and in ours. In their study, 79% of the weight judgments fell on integral multiples of .10 (as compared with only 37% of guesses of the target proportion). In the current study, about 75% of the weight judgments fell on integral multiples of .10 (as compared with 53% for the target proportion).
Coverage and Squared Error
We now turn to the evaluation of the obtained priors, in light of the true value of the parameter 0.300B. The priors will be evaluated using three different standards: Two are based on calibration (or coverage), the standard used in much of the literature on subjective priors; and expected squared error, the standard used by Samaniego and Reneau (1994) .
Coverage. To evaluate coverage, we converted each judged (p*, w) pair into a corresponding Beta prior distribution {3 (a, b) . For each Beta prior estimate, we calculated the BO% and 95% Highest Density Regions (HDRs) as the estimated interval for all cases where this gave a reasonable answer-that is, all cases except for weight judgments exactly equal to 0 or 1. The former (7 respondents for N = 10, 3 for N = 50) were all counted as not covering the true parameter, as none of the estimates was very close to 0.30, while the latter subset (10 with weights 1.00 for N = 10, and 15 for N = 50) were all viewed as expressing complete or nearly complete prior ignorance and hence as having priors that did cover the true value.
Posterior distributions were calculated by combining each prior with the binomial likelihood function for each possible outcome from samples of 10 or 50. The marginal posterior coverage rate was obtained by weighting the possible outcomes by their binomial probabilities with N = 10 or 50 and with a true proportion of .300B. This procedure is given in more detail, with an example, in the appendix. Table 1 summarizes the coverage proportions for the full data and 141 "good" respondents. There was gross undercoverage: around .50 or less for BO% HDRs and around 0.60 for 95% HDRs. These results were well within the range found in studies of direct interval judgments (cited above). They were, however, reliably smaller than the (0.69, 0.86) coverage proportions obtained by Samaniego and Reneau. The posterior coverage proportions were not substantially larger: In most cases they increased by roughly 10% and less, and they remained smaller than the coverage proportions from Samaniego and Reneau. Prior coverage proportions were affected by the order in which the weight judgments were made. If the respondents first judged the smaller N = 10 sample, then when they next judged the larger N = 50 sample, they failed to increase the weight to the proper size, resulting in even narrower prior estimates and therefore reduced coverages. The 80% prior HDR coverage was reduced from .54 to 04'1, and the 95% coverage was reduced from .65 to .58. The reverse pattern was observed when respondents first judged the larger N = 50 sample. They did not lower sufficiently the N = 10 weight, resulting in wider interval estimates and increased coverages from (041, .52) to (.50, .61) .
First judgments to the larger sample also produced lower coverages. The 100 respondents who judged N = 50 first had coverage proportions at (041, .52), which were smaller than the (.54, .65) proportions obtained from the other 101 respondents who judged N = 10 first. This was related to the insufficient weight differences shown in Figure 1 (b) . The priors for the 100 respondents who judged N = 50 first were narrower and less likely to enclose .3008.
Our 141 "good" subjects seemed to be more resilient to the withinsubject anchoring effect. The coverages across two sample size judgments were roughly the same. Between the groups of respondents, those who judged N = 10 first had a better coverage. For the larger sample size (N = 50), the reverse pattern was observed.
Expected squared error. Samaniego and Reneau found that 88 of their 99 students provided priors that reduced expected squared error. In line with the somewhat poorer coverage shown by our respondents, only 62% of them (121 out of 196 who gave nonzero weight to N = 10) provided priors that were beneficial by this criterion. The percentage remained the same even if we considered only the "good" respondents (86 out of 141, or 61%).
As pointed out by Samaniego and Reneau, when the true parameter value is known, the Bayesian estimate is guaranteed to have smaller expected squared error than the frequentist estimate for a given sample size if the deviation between the prior point estimate and the true value is within one standard error of the true proportion (even if negligible weight is given to the sample). In the present case, the standard error for p = 0.301, N = 10 is 0.145; thus, the prior point estimate is always useful with a sample of size 10 when it is in the range (.156, .446). Two thirds of the Samaniego and Reneau respondents provided estimates in this range, while only 57% of our good and 60% of our flawed respondents did so. These differences were apt to be mostly chance fluctuations in guessing the true proportion (and in fact, none of the differences were statistically reliable), but they contributed to the differences between the proportions of beneficial priors.
When we focused on the remaining cases, those with point errors exceeding one standard error, the Samaniego and Reneau respondents were clearly superior to our good respondents in assigning large enough weights to a sample of size 10 (22 out of the 33 Samaniego and Reneau respondents versus 22 out of 61 of our good respondents). The low weights, seen in Figure 2 (b), were important here. Indeed, our flawed respondents did better here precisely because of the individuals who set the weight for N = 10 second. A number of them seemed to have taken this opportunity to recognize that they had set their weight for N = 50 too low, and set a higher weight for N = 10, preferring to be sensible later rather than not at all.
Priors elicited by the weight assignment method were most often beneficial, in terms of the squared error loss criterion , but we failed to match Samaniego and Reneau's quantitative estimate of benefit. This arose for two reasons. Our data suggested that Samaniego and Reneau might have had a somewhat lucky sample, in terms of guesses close to the true proportion; they also had respondents who more reliably avoided assigning very low weights to new information, on their first exposure to this task. This was consistent with the differences in sampled population (statistics students versus volunteers selected haphazardly on campus).
Conclusions from Experiment 1
Our results suggest that many college students fail to grasp the weight-judgment task fully; in particular, they do not immediately recognize the importance of sample size for the weight to be assigned, and they may assign weights that are not conCOIrdant with sample size. On balance, there is a clear effect of sample size in the desired direction; and if one eliminates respondents with nonconcordant ordering of weights, the group distributions for N = 10 and N = 50 are related about as one would hope for applications of the Bayesian schema. Even for these concordant respondents, however, prior and posterior coverages are poor: The weight assigned to new data is often low, and it does not increase when the prior guess is far from the mark.
Our sample differs from that of Samaniego and Reneau: Their students were somewhat more accurate in coming close to the unknown proportion (this was probably luck) and avoided assigning very low weights to new samples (a possible effect of statistical sophistication). This combination yielded substantially lower coverage rates in the present experiment than they found for N = 10. Our coverage rates, however, did not improve for N = 50, where our respondents produced many fewer very low weights. The weights on new data are still much too low. Overconfidence in prior guesses on this task seems to be robust.
Experiments 2 and 3: Estimation Problems
Where Respondents Have Expertise An obvious advantage of "almanac" questions is their convenience. The answers are known well enough to serve as a standard to estimate coverage. The question about Maugham's novel is similarly convenient.
As a basis for evaluating statistical methodology, however, these types of questions have two serious flaws. First, the prior probabilities of most subjects are not based on expert knowledge, whereas, in a typical statistical application, the investigators should have spent considerable effort finding out what is already known. Second, the weight-judgment method would often be unusable, because new measurements cannot easily be viewed as leading to an estimator with an approximately known variance. This is possible for the Samaniego and Reneau experiment, because one can indeed sample pages from Maugham's novel and categorize them with respect to first-word length, but it is not similarly possible to make judgments of length of rivers, populations of states, crime rates , and so forth. The measurement procedures by which new data would be generated relevant to such questions are complex and require expert knowledge that typical subjects lack.
From this standpoint, results from attitude surveys have a distinct advantage. College student subjects have some exposure to others' attitudes about a given topic and thus have a reasonable basis for a prior probability distribution; survey sampling with N = 10 or N = 50 is a natural way to gather new data; and large surveys provide a gold standard for the answers.
For example , consider the item, "I just cannot understand mathematics," with five possible responses, Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. The population parameters of interest are proportions of various responses, for instance, the proportion of respondents who agree that they just cannot understand mathematics (answered Strongly Agree or Agree); or proportion who responded the complementary (Neutral or negative responses). College student participants should have reasonable expertise pertaining to responses of fellow students to such an item, and can readily understand the added knowledge that would be provided by small surveys.
Experiments 2 and 3 asked college students to estimate the results of an attitude survey. Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 to include 40 questions (with a constant reference sample size, 10 or 50) and 5 repeated questions referring to the other sample size.
Demanding 45 weight judgments allowed us to recognize some serious problems resulting from a weight scale on the interval from 0 to 1, matching the probability scale. Many response patterns suggested deep confusion. We modified the weight judgment task for Experiment 3. Experiment 2 will be reported in brief, to highlight the difficulties encountered. Experiment 3 is reported in detail.
Method Experiment 2: Participants
Students from Columbia University (n = 150) were asked to estimate proportions of responses from a large-scale survey previously conducted at Barnard College, Columbia University. The true values of the proportions were estimated from a sample of 1366 respondents and are thus close to a gold standard. The survey, probing career interests and some other career-related attitudes, was administered to all first-year Barnard students during orientation week in 1985 , 1986 , and 1987 (Chipman, Krantz, & Silver, 1992 .
For example, the statement "I just cannot understand mathematics" was one of the survey items. As it happened, 256 out of 1363 valid responses (18.8%) checked "Strongly agree" or "Agree." We took p = .188 to be a good estimate of the true population proportion who agree with the statement. And so on, for every item or every combination of responses to different items. We selected 40 items for Experiment 2. The items were selected so that their true proportions spanned a range from nearly 0% to almost 100%.
Procedure
The respondents were presented (using an interactive computer program) with the 40 questions one at a time. Using the weight method as described previously, they were first asked to enter a best guess with regards to the target proportion , followed by entering a weight for either a reference sample of 10 (73 respondents started with N = 10 first) or 50 (77 respondents). They were prompted, for example:
Barnard students were asked "I just cannot understand mathematics" and could respond "Strongly Agree ," "Agree," "Neutral," "Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree."
What is your best guess of the percentage of Barnard students who answered "Strongly Agree" or "Agree?"
The percentage is: % My weight placed on a sample of 10 is:
After the first 40 questions, the computer program paused shortly and instructed the respondent that 5 of the previously seen questions were to be repeated under a larger (N= 10 to N= 50) or a smaller sample size.
The computer-interactive program emphasized that the subject should always estimate the outcomes of the survey, which was conducted in the late 1980s. They should not guess what the answers were in late 1990s and early 2000. They were given three practice questions with feedback of the survey results to remind them that the answers might be very different in the 1980s.
Results and Discussion
A number of respondents gave stereotyped judgments that suggested the possibility of careless responses, which raised serious doubts about the validity of their answers. Figure 3 shows several examples of steoreotyped judgments. Plots on the left show the weights against best guesses plotted across 40 questions. Plots on the right show the weights against the errors. These plots allow one to detect and remove quite a number of subjects who generated weight judgments based on strategies that do not reflect levels of prior knowledge about the particular items. For example, Subject 123 consistently gave a weight judgment close to the guessed proportion, producing a correlation near one between these two supposedly unrelated judgments. Other panels in the figure illustrate other patterns that we considered problematic. For example, Subject 117 assigned a weight of 0.50 for all guesses, which could be attributed to a general response strategy to use 50-50 to indicate ignorance. More than half of the respondents (n = 79) produced problematic weight judgments akin to one of these patterns. Eighteen correlations were large negative (r~ -.28, e.g., Subject 22), but the majority were large positive correlations between weights and best guesses (n = 46), and 15 subjects produced nearconstant weight judgments. .8 We decided that we had learned something about the weightjudgment procedure. Rather than analyze these data further, we changed the procedure to one much harder to misunderstand.
Experiment 3: Quantitative Judgment of Relative Weights
The problematic responses in Experiment 2 can be partly attributed to the direct numeric weight assignment method. With two numeric entries juxtaposed and using a common scale, many respondents were confused. In this experiment the direct weight assignment method was modified slightly to emphasize weighting the subjects' own guesses against a random sample.
Method Respondents
Participants recruited for the experiment were 103 Columbia undergraduate students. They were paid $3.00 for completing the computer-interactive experiment.
Procedure
A modified weight assignment method was used. The respondent was first asked to type in a numeric best guess, followed by a two-stage relative weighting question as follows: The two-step relative weight assignment task may reduce the response problems described in Experiment 2. It prompts the respondents to focus on the relative merits of thl3 prior estimate and a random sample. The first rough comparison is easier and more intuitive, and the categorical response scale avoids pressure to generate excessively accurate numerical responses (which typically is resisted, by assigning multiples of .10).
For many data analyses, the categorical responses were converted to weights on a 0 to 1 scale. If higher confidence was assigned to the hypothetical random sample, then the converted weight for the random sample was 0.50 (nearly 1:1), 0.56 (1 1/4 :1) , 0.60 (1 1/2: 1), ... , up to 0.97 (30 : 1) and 0.99 (100 : 1). A (1 1/2 : 1) response meant a 3 : 2 weight division between the random sample and the respondent's best guess, and thus a 3/5 = 0.60 weight for the sample. For hiigher confidence in the prior guess, the conversion was to the complementary weights.
Similar to Experiment 2, 40 target questions were first presented, either with a reference sample size of 10 or 50, followed by a randomly selected subset of 5 questions repeated in a larger or smaller sample size.
Results and Discussion
Weight vs. Accuracy of Guessed p
The top two panels of Figure 4 plot the converted weight judgments against the accuracy of the guessed proportion, measured by the absolute deviations between the prior best guesses and the true answers. Each point represents the weight and error deviation for a abs(guessed p -true p) Figure 4 . Plots of average weight judgments (top two plots) and corresponding prior 80% HDR coverages in relation to the accuracy of their best guesses (bottom two plots). Accuracy is derived from the absolute value of the differences between guessed proportions and the true proportions. Smoothed local regression lines are added to show the relationship between weight and accuracy for the first 40 judgments. particular question, averaged across respondents. Data from the two experimental manipulations are plotted separately. Smoothed local regression lines are added to show the overall relationship between weights and accuracy for the first 40 judgments. The two bottom panels plot the corresponding calibration of these judgmE~nts. Calibration results from Experiment 1 are added for comparison. There appears to be no strong overall systematic relationship between weights and accuracy, as suggested by the roughly flat local regression lines. Accuracy varies considerably across questions, but remains similar across experimental conditions. There is similar spread in accuracy, deviating from the true answers by approximately .10 to .40. Subjects did not substantially improve their accuracy in the repeated questions, as shown by the large filled points.
In the initial 40 judgments, the larger, N = 50 reference sample size elicited only marginally higher weights. Subjects who judged N = 50 first assigned an average weight of .58 to the first 40 questions; while subjects who judged N = 10 first assigned an average weight of .52. This .06 difference was only marginally different (quasi F(1, 101.9) = 3.29, P < .072).
However, subjects were sensitive to the contrasting sample size when they encountered the five repeated questions. Those who began with N = 10 shifted their average weight on the repeated items with N = 50 from .52 to .68. In the opposite order, the shift was from .58 for N = 50 to .40
for N = 10. This interaction was statistically reliable (averaged across questions, 1(101) = 11.45, P < .0001).
These within-subject weight shifts affected calibration appreciably. The bottom left panel of Figure 4 shows that the weight increase from N Looking only at the 5 repeated items for each subject, the interaction contrast for calibration changes was statistically significant (contrast value = .14, yielding 1(101) = -2.57, P < .006).
When accuracy is low, assigning low weights to data can be costly: The five repeated questions in the bottom right panel produced only 19% coverage for what were supposed to be 80% intervals, a more severe failure than any we know of in the literature.
Answers to the word length question were more accurate (less than .15 deviation) and better calibrated. Within-subject weight shifts observed in Experiment 1 appeared to have only limited effect on calibration.
Respondents who judged N = 10 first increased the weights from .36 to .53, which was associated with a worsened coverage from .54 to .41. The other group who received the opposite order decn3ased the weights from .51 to .37, which was associated with a slight incn3ase in calibration. Our college-aged student respondents appeared to know more about word length in Maugham's novel than about the results of a survey probing their peers' career-related attitudes.
Within-subject and between-group weight shifts. Figure 5 (a) plots the within-subject pairs of weights. Each point represents one pair of weights given at two reference sample sizes. The diagonal line indicates no weight shift and the heavy curve indicates the Bayes' Theorem shift. An immediately visible pattern is that most pOints fall above the diagonal, indicating that with practice most respondents are able to make weight shifts in the correct direction. Some weights are in the wrong direction (below diagonal), and these nonconcordant weight pairs occur more often when respondents first judged N = 10. Weights that are not concordant with N = 101 versus N = 50 can be signs of confusion about the task; but they can also occur by chance even for a subject who understands the task well, because people probably do not remember either their judgments or the underlying reasoning from the first presentation when they come to the repetition with a different sample size. If such chance fluctuations in judgment were the only factor underlying nonconcordance, one would expElct the distribution of nonconcordances across five repetitions to be roughly binomial, Binom (5, q) , where q is the probability of nonconcordance.
The average number of nonconcordances with N = 10 first was .361, while the average with N = 50 first was .157; these are natural estimates of the binomial probability of nonconcordancl8 in the two groups. However, these resulting binomial distributions Binom(5, .361) and Binom(5, .157) fit the obseNed distributions very poorly. Among the 56 respondents who judged N = 10 first, the number of observed respondents with zero through five nonconcordances was 18, 11, 7, 8, 8, and 4 . The expected frequencies under Binom (Ei, .361) would be 6, 17, 19, 11, 3, and o. Thus, a much more plausible model for this group would be a mixture, with 32 "good" subjects having a probability of nonconcordance of .11 for anyone repetition. This would generate expected frequencies of 18, 11, and 3 for zer%ne, and two out of five nonconcordances, respectively; only 0.36 occurrences would be expected for three or more nonconcordances. According to such a model, all of the subjects with three, four, or five nonconcordances would be classified as at least partly "confused."
Lack of fit is also seen among the 47 respondl9nts who judged N = 50 first, though it is less severe: The frequencies of zero to five nonconcordances were 28, 10, 5, 1, 1, and 2, as compared with the binomial expected frequencies of 20, 19, 7, 1, 0, and o. This reasoning led us to analyze as a separate group the 79 subjects who showed only zero, one, or two nonconcordances. Figure 5 (b) and (c) compare the weight distributions for N = 10 and N = 50 using quantilequantile plots. Part (b) is for the initial 40 and part (c) for the five repeated judgments. In each plot, the diagonal line shows the relationship expected for two identical distributions, while the heavy CUNe shows the relationship expected from Bayes' rule.
Part (b) shows that, for the initial judgments, the relationship between the weight distributions for the two sample sizes is far from the Bayesian ideal and does not change even after omitting the 24 respondents who had three or more nonconcordances, as indicated by the mostly overlapping solid and dashed CUNes. The area under the Bayesian ideal CUNe is .75, and the area under the CUNe for all subjects is .54 with a standard deviation of 0.03 via bootstrapping; for good subjects it is .55 with a standard deviation of .03. The two obsen/ed CUNes overlap but they deviate reliably from the theoretical CUNeo Part (c) shows that the relationship between the weight distributions obtained from the five repeated judgments closely follows the theoretical curve; the area under the observed curve for all subjects is .72 with a standard deviation of .03, which is not reliably different from the .75 area under the theoretical curve. The relationship for the 79 good subjects goes slightly above the theoretical curve, although the area under the curve, .79 with a standard deviation of .03, is not reliably different from the theoretical curve.
This last result incorporates both considerable practice and two contrast effects: the shift from N = 10 to N = 50 for one group and the opposite shift for the other. An optimistic interpretation would be that with practice and with attention having been drawn to the importance of sample size, people do begin to take sample size into account to about the right extent. However, as shown by Figure 4 , these repeated judgments remain very poorly calibrated.
Point Estimates
Recall that 88 out of 99 students in Samaniego and Reneau's study satisfied their criterion for good estimation: That is, their priors were such that posterior point estimates would have smaller expected squared error than the maximum likelihood estimator. In Experiment 1 only 62% of our participants satisfied this criterion with N = 10. For Experiment 3, the criterion was satisfied by 64% of the 40 initial priors with N = 10 and by only 39% with N = 50. The maximum likelihood estimator is much more accurate with N = 50, and the priors failed to keep pace with this (for the five repeated judgments, the respective figures were 53% for N= 10 and 46% for N= 50).
The prior point estimates themselves are fairly consistent for the initial and repeated judgments: Many pairs are near the 45-degree line on the scatterplot and the overall correlation coefficient was 0.63. About 10% of the judgments showed considerable discrepancy, changing from a value well above or below .50 on the initial judgment to one in the opposite direction on the repeated judgment, or vice-versa.
Experiment 2 provides clear warning of the pitfalls in interpreting numerical judgment. We asked for two responses on a 0% to 100% scale, one to be interpreted as a guessed percentage and the other as the weight that should be used in computing a weighted average. Over 30% of our respondents did not clearly distinguish these two tasks, as evidenced by strong correlations (usually positive) between these two numerical responses. This probably means that they did not understand either task very clearly. It seems likely that a larger number would have understood either of the two tasks in isolation: Combining them was confusing. In Experiment 3, when we used labeled weight-ratio categories for the second task, the correlations disappeared entirely.
Another 10% of our respondents gave nearly constant weights of 50% in Experiment 2. This may be a conventional "default" response , that is, an even split is considered fair, akin to 50-50 for complete ignorance. This tendency also disappeared in Experiment 3.
We therefore tentatively recommend a scale with labeled categories of weight ratios , if the weight-judgment method is to be developed further as a Bayesian method.
The main result of Experiment 3 concerns sensitivity to size of the reference sample in the weight-judgment method. In the second set of judgments, after encountering a new sample size, subjects showed considerable shifts in aSSigned weights, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure   5 (c). The shift from N = 50 to N = 10 generally led to lower weights assigned to the sample; only about 10% of respondents in this group had three or more nonconcordances between weight ordering and sample size. However, these lower weights led to poor calibration, as noted below. The group shifted from N = 10 to N = 50 produced higher weights and slightly better calibration; but about 35% of the respondents had three or more nonconcordances. In this group, the frequency distribution of nonconcordances is sharply bimodal, rather than binomial; so there is a distinct and substantial subgroup that did not respond strongly to the upward shift in sample size.
Experiment 3 also shows that subjects are insensitive to the quality of their prior guesses. This lack of meta knowledge of one's likely accuracy appears to be prevalent, both observed in Experiments 1 (Figure 2 (b, c) ) and 3 ( Figure 4 ) and also by Samaniego and Reneau (although less severe, see Figure 2 (a)). There is no correlation between the accuracy of the prior guesses and the magnitude of the corresponding weights. This apparent insensitivity to the quality of prior estimates is partly responsible for the low calibration in confident but inaccurate estimates. Its mitigating effects are even stronger in the five repeated judgments of N = 10 after judging N = 50 first. The calibration is lower than 30% for 80% confidence.
This lack of sensitivity to the quality of prior estimates suggests an additional problem. If respondents are sometimes nearly on target just by luck, but poor guesses are just as confident as lucky ones, then there is little hope for intelligent selection of situations in which priors will be useful. As there is no way to reliably distinguish informative subjective estimates from the bad ones, one alternative is to use coherence as a criterion for selecting subjective estimates; coherence has been shown here as a good indication for useful priors. In the context of the weight judgment task, coherence among estimates can be examined by assigning weights to several different sample sizes as part of the elicitation process (as we have done), and perhaps can be ensured by repeated training with a series of different reference sample sizes.
These results, combined with literature findings, provide clues as to the elusive processes that govern people's intuitive weight judgment. The overconfidence literature in psychology shows that people in general are unable to appropriately evaluate the credence of evidence. This is considered one of the fundamental biases in probability judgments (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) . Intuitive judgments are heavily influenced by the representativeness of information pertaining to the target of evaluation, and not by the credence of that evidence (e.g., sample size). Subjects are also known to respond to what is being manipulated in an experiment even though it is not normative to do so (Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984) .
Consider a two-stage thinking schema in weight judgment. Subjects are likely to first derive their best guesses from the familiarity or representativeness of their intuitive impressions about what the target proportions may be. Next they evaluate the credence of their intuitive impressions. When prompted with different reference samples for weights, subjects respond to them by giving weights that reflect the availability and perhaps the vividness of such impressions, taking into consideration the obvious-weights to N = 50 should be larger to those to N = 10. Thus high weights may be assigned to strong but inaccurate impressions and similarly low weights to weak but accurate impressions. The result is a lack of correlation between knowledge and weights.
Conclusion
In this final section we comment on the use of weight judgments in eliciting subjective priors, in the hope of extracting generalizable principles to improve the quality of such estimates and to draw connections between the present results and the probability calibration literature in psychology. Questions we seek to answer are more practical than theoretical. Among them are: How does the weight judgment task compare to the extensively used subjective quantile method in facilitating probability calibration? Additionally, what task characteristics in weight judgment affect performance in terms of reliability, probability calibration and expected square error, and to that end , why were Samaniego and Reneau's results better than ours?
We have discussed possible biases in the method and provided tests in two knowledge domains, demonstrating some confusion on the part of many subjects. Subjects who have reasonable knowledge can learn to use Samaniego and Reneau's method to assign sensible weights, if careful instructions and some practice are given. However, the overall calibration near 55% for 80% confidence remains no better than what is typically observed using the subjective quantile method. A handful of inaccurate and overconfident estimates are miserably calibrated at an average coverage of only 10% to 30% for 80% confidence. Samaniego and Reneau's results are better than ours in coverage (both prior and posterior) and in squared error. Their superior results are largely attributed to larger weights assigned to data, because their subjects are only slightly more accurate than ours in guessing word length. Their subjects, presumably more quantitatively sophisticated students in statistics, appear to possess better expertise not as much in accuracy but in a better awareness to trust their own guesses less and randomly sampled data more.
The present findings contribute to the literature in two ways: first in the decision to choose a frequentist or a Bayesian approach. If a rough answer is sufficient, and the cost of collecting data is high, then a subjective estimate from a trustworthy and likely informative expert may be useful. One should be mindful that an expert who claims to be 80% correct may be correct only 50% of the time. However, if a precise answer is desired and the consequences of inaccuracy are severe, then one should refrain from incorporating potentially biased subjective estimates in the process. Secondly, in the event that there are no other available data except experts' judgments, then the present studies highlight the importance of training and clear instructions, perhaps using a variety of sample sizes if the weight judgment elicitation technique is preferred, and the expert respondents should be given feedback to improve their coherence. Without a clearcut guideline as to when to choose to be a frequentist or a Bayesian, we are less optimistic than Samaniego and Reneau in the value of subjective Bayesian estimates.
Next we use an example to show how these computations were carried out in three sequential steps.
A best guess of .40 and a weight of .50 to a re·ference sample of size 10 transalates to a prior of [3(a = 4, b = 6) . The 80% HDR for this prior is (.20, .58), which covers the true answer of 0.3008.
If the respondent randomly sampled 10 pages from the Maugham book and o page turned out to contain words longer than 6 characters, then the posterior is [3(4 + 0, 6 + 10) = [3(4, 16), which has a 80% HDR of (.08 , .29) that does not cover .3008. The binomial probability for k = 0 is (' 0" ) .30080 (1 -.3008)10 = 0.03. The binomial probability is 0.12 for k = 1, 0.23 for k = 2, . .. , to 6 x 10-6 for k = 10. The 
